The continuing duty of criminal defense counsel to their former clients, even when those former clients bring post-conviction actions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, has existed as a national practice standard in capital cases since at least 1987. In addition to its inclusion in the ABA's Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases since 1989, duties to former clients exist in state ethics rules as well as the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The duty has been further operationalized in non-capital litigation through a 2010 ABA formal ethics opinion concerning disclosures by trial counsel to prosecutors in ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims, case law and scholarship. There are no empirical data concerning its operation in practice, and these are difficult to obtain because much of the continuing duty operates through informal practices. This paper describes the results of a brief survey intended to develop these data.
INTRODUCTION
The continuing duty of criminal defense counsel to their former clients, even when those former clients bring post-conviction actions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, has existed as a national practice standard since at least 1987.
1 Since then, the contours of the duty have been defined with greater precision. For instance, guideline 10.13 of the American Bar Association's (ABA's) Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases states:
In accordance with professional norms, all persons who are or have been members of the defense team have a continuing duty to safeguard the interests of the client and should cooperate fully with successor counsel. This duty includes, but is not limited to:
A. maintaining the records of the case in a manner that will inform successor counsel of all significant developments relevant to the litigation; B. providing the client's files, as well as information regarding all aspects of the representation, to successor counsel;
C. sharing potential further areas of legal and factual research with successor counsel; and D. cooperating with such professionally appropriate legal strategies as may be chosen by successor counsel.
2
Other recitations of duties owed to former clients exist in state ethics rules, 3 as well as the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 4 The duty has been further operationalized in a 2010 ABA Formal Ethics Opinion concerning disclosures by trial counsel to prosecutors in 2 GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES Guideline 10.13 (AM. BAR ASS'N, Rev. ed. 2003) , in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003) To date, however, there has been no empirical data concerning the operation of the continuing duty in practice, a result that is hardly surprising given that discussions about the continuing duty tend to occur informally between lawyers and often without documentation. This paper is the first to provide some data concerning how the continuing duty operates in practice.
I. METHODOLOGY The attached survey (Appendix 1) was administered as a convenience sample at a national training conference of invited capital litigators on July 17-20, 2014. 9 The survey was distributed at the conference registration desk and attendees were reminded throughout the conference to complete the survey. Finally, the last conference presentation addressed the continuing duty and the presenter (one author) reminded attendees to complete the survey, copies of which were left at each seat. Attendees were informed that the survey was anonymous, that no case-specific or client-specific information would be sought, and that only aggregate data would be reported. Thus, the survey includes no questions involving narrative responses and seeks no identifying information about respondents (e.g., geographic or jurisdictional information).
Conference registrations totaled about 200 participants, and attendees at the final presentation were about 150. Thirty-three completed surveys were submitted. The survey included four sections: Section I addressed the experience of state court capital trial counsel; Section II addressed the experience of federal court capital trial counsel; Section III addressed the experience of state capital post-conviction counsel; and Section IV addressed the experience of federal capital habeas counsel. Survey respondents were instructed to complete a section if it was applicable to their practice experience since 2003; otherwise they were to proceed to the following section.
The first question for each section asked how many clients in the relevant category had the respondent represented since 2003. 2003 was chosen as the start date because this was the year of the introduction of the ABA's performance guidelines, which first formalized the continuing duty.
Areas of Insufficient Data
While we report data on capital trial counsel, responses showed that each capital trial counsel had only handled one capital case that had gone to the post-conviction phase since 2003. Thus, the experience of these respondents cannot be meaningfully seen as representative, and no frequency can be estimated. While respondents indicated handling only six cases as state court capital trial counsel, one respondent indicated the prosecutor had sought to communicate with counsel about the case on matters other than scheduling. Thus, while it is impossible to tell the frequency of this phenomenon, it is at least nonzero. No respondents in this category indicated an effort by prosecutors to obtain a file outside of discovery. As no respondents completed the section for Federal Court capital trial counsel (Section II), these data are omitted.
II. ANALYSIS
The remaining three foci of practice experience (state capital trial counsel, state capital post-conviction counsel and federal habeas capital counsel) were not unique, i.e., some respondents had experience with more than one type of practice. There were six responses to Section I (state capital trial practice), 22 to Section III (state capital post-conviction practice) and 22 to Section IV (federal capital habeas proceedings). 10 10 There were twenty-three responses to Section IV. However, one response (survey #33) was all "zeros," indicating this respondent should have omitted this section.
The responses to both Sections III (for counsel handling state capital post-conviction cases) and IV (counsel handling federal capital habeas proceedings) showed respondents had handled a median of 6 to 10 capital cases on post-conviction or habeas since 2003. The 22 respondents who had handled at least one capital state post-conviction case since 2003 had a range of experiences with trial counsel. While 41% reported trial counsel "never" refused to provide their file to post-conviction counsel when given a signed release from the client, 36% reported that trial counsel refused "rarely," and 23% refused "about half the time."
11 Access by postconviction counsel to trial counsel's file in practice is thus clearly not a given despite the existence of guideline 10.13.
12
Access to trial counsel's strategic thinking also appeared inconsistent. Only 18% of respondents indicated that trial counsel "never" refused to discuss their former client's case with post-conviction counsel after being provided a written waiver from their former client. Moreover, 45% of respondents indicated trial counsel rarely refused to discuss a former client's case, and 18% indicated that trial counsel refused to discuss a former client's case "about half the time." Additionally, 14% of respondents indicated that prior counsel refused to discuss the former client's case with post-conviction counsel "often," and 5% of postconviction counsel indicated that prior counsel "always" refused to discuss former client's case. Given the small number of respondents, distinguishing frequencies is not possible. However, given that guideline 10.13 clearly indicates a duty to provide strategic thinking to postconviction counsel, it is troubling that 82% of respondents indicated this occurred less than all the time (i.e., anything other than "never"), and 37% indicated that it happened about half the time or more.
Post-conviction counsel's experience with the continuing duty in federal habeas corpus proceedings is similar.
13 While 48% of habeas counsel reported that prior counsel "never" refused to provide habeas counsel their file given a written release from the former client, 38% indicated that prior counsel "rarely" did so and 14% indicated that prior counsel did so "about half the time." Readiness to discuss the case with habeas counsel appeared somewhat better than in the state post-conviction context, with 27% of respondents indicating that prior counsel "never" refused, and 50% indicating prior counsel "rarely" refused. Only 23% of respondents indicated that prior counsel refused to discuss the case with federal habeas counsel "about half the time" or more.
Finally, reports of some prior counsel refusing to discuss a case without the prosecutor present (which would be inconsistent with the 11 See infra Table 1. 12 See ABA GUIDELINE 10.13, supra note 2. 13 See infra Table 2. ABA's Formal Opinion 10-456 14 ), although measurable, appear uncommon. That said, 86% of both state post-conviction counsel and federal habeas respondents reported "never" having experienced this. 
CONCLUSION
Although this survey cannot be considered a nationally representative sample, as it was a convenience sample administered to attendees at an invitation-only conference, it is the first effort to empirically measure the operation of the continuing duty. While case law addressing efforts to implement the duty clearly suggests the duty is not self-executing, no extant data suggests the magnitude of this effect. These data show that, at least as experienced by leading capital practitioners from around the country, successor counsel face difficulty obtaining trial files from prior counsel, even with a release from the client, in a small but measurable share of cases. While the phenomenon appears rare, it is not unknown-14-23% of respondents experienced it about half the time.
A more significant problem seems to be gaining prior counsel's strategic thinking through direct communication with successor counsel. While both state and federal successor counsel most often report that prior counsel "rarely" refuses to communicate, 28-37% report it occurring at least half the time or more. This experience seems more frequent in state than in federal practice. Directing successor counsel to the prosecutor for the file or requesting the presence of the prosecutor for discussion with successor counsel were not reported as frequently. While the continuing duty is established in law and ethical guidance, it is still not universally operationalized. 
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